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Articles
Unconditional Surrender: The Rise of President Erdogan
and the end of Kemalist Turkey
By Amelia Sullivan
Abstract: In October 1923, Mustafa Kemal, or Ataturk, became
leader of Turkey. Over the next decade and a half, Kemal used his
considerable political power to reform the nation. He modernized
infrastructure, reorganized government, and led an aggressive
campaign to westernize and secularize Turkish society. By the time
Kemal passed in 1938, Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman
Empire and reestablished itself as a democracy. Almost eighty
years later, Ataturk’s legacy is in jeopardy. In 2017, the Turkey
held a constitutional referendum to radically restructure the
nation’s government and place an unprecedented degree of power
in the office of the presidency. The new constitution passed by a
narrow margin in a referendum marred by allegations of fraud and
intimidation. By closely examining sources such as the 1924
Turkish Constitution, the revised Constitution’s proposed
amendments, and Erdogan’s past political history, this paper seeks
to answer several questions: How will the revised constitution
restructure Turkish government? What will a Turkey under
Erdogan’s leadership look like? Is this the end of secular Turkey
as Ataturk envisioned it?
Since the earliest day of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk (1881-1938) maintained that, “Sovereignty belongs
unconditionally to the people,” and for decades, this dictum laid at
the very foundation of Turkish governance.1 In October 1925,
Kemal was unanimously elected the first President of the newly
formed Republic of Turkey. His election marked the beginning of
an era of sweeping social, political, and religious reform within the
1
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nation. Ataturk shifted Turkey away from Ottoman systems of
religious authoritarianism and created a new government based
upon the principles of secular democracy. For nearly one hundred
years, Ataturk’s undying belief in democracy and secularism
guided Turkish politicians as they amended the nation’s
constitution or created new laws. Recent events, however, conspire
to bring an end to Ataturk’s vision.
On April 16, 2017, Turkey held a referendum on a revised
Constitution, proposed by the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP). The revised constitution is comprised of eighteen
amendments, eliminating the role of Prime Minister, weakening
the Parliament, and greatly expanding the authority of the
Presidency. The document passed by a narrow margin, opening a
schism in Turkish public opinion. The Constitution’s proponents
argue that the document’s ratification prevents the return of the
fragile coalition governments that have haunted Turkey’s past.2 In
addition, a more powerful presidency would end conflict between
various branches of government, allowing the nation to pull itself
from political stagnation. Opponents of the proposal, however,
argue that a strong executive branch could spell the end of the
Republic of Turkey and the return to autocratic rule.3 The nation’s
current President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (b. 1954), is Ataturk’s
polar opposite. Erdogan is a devout Muslim, an ardent admirer of
Turkey’s Ottoman past, and once stated that “democracy is like a
train… we shall get out when we arrive at the station.”4 Damning
evidence of Erdogan’s anti-democratic ambitions surfaced in the
wake of the referendum. Videos showed referendum officials
marking blank ballots in favor of the revised constitution, or some
individuals voting more than once.5 Testimony corroborating the
videos’ content emerged shortly thereafter. The opposition accused
2

Birce Bora, “Turkey’s constitutional reform: All you need to know,” Al
Jazeera, January 17, 2017,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/turkey-constitutionalreform-170114085009105.html.
3
Ibid.
4
Aram Bakshian Jr., “Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk,” The National Interest 127,
(2013): 63.
5
“Turkey: Videos show electoral fraud and ballot stuffing,” The Observers,
April 18, 2017, http://observers.france24.com/en/20170418-turkey-videosshow-electoral-fraud-ballot-stuffing.

2

Unconditional Surrender

the President and his officials of rigging the referendum and called
for the constitution’s nullification. Many fear that with nearly
unlimited executive power, Erdogan will discard Ataturk’s
secularist policies, override the people’s sovereignty, and
transform the Republic into an Islamic dictatorship.
This paper will be divided into two broad categories: the
first discussing the 1924 Turkish Constitution and its history, while
the second focuses on Erdogan and his motivations. In its first
section, this paper will discuss Turkey’s Ottoman past, Ataturk’s
rise to power, and his subsequent reimagining of Turkey as a
secular democracy. The paper will then examine the 1924 Turkish
Constitution’s provisions in order to establish the role of President,
Parliament, and Prime Minister. In addition, this section will offer
background on the revised Constitution, summarize its eighteen
amendments, then compare and contrast the new document against
the 1924 Constitution. In doing so, this paper will illustrate how
the revised Constitution will totally restructure Turkish
Government.
In its second section, the paper will offer background on
President Erdogan and examine where Erdogan’s ideological
convictions deviate from Ataturk’s. The paper will closely
scrutinize Erdogan’s tenure as President and examine numerous
anti-democratic statements and policies espoused by Erdogan.
Close analysis of Erdogan’s words and actions will allow for an
accurate estimation of where Erdogan will likely lead the nation
and the threat he poses to the Republic of Turkey’s survival as a
secular democracy.

The Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Legacy
For nearly six centuries, the Ottoman Empire remained the
dominant power in the Middle East. At the height of its power, the
Empire’s borders engulfed much of the Middle East, as well as
parts of southeastern Europe and northern Africa. Within these
territories, the Ottomans created a diverse, thriving society based
upon systems of military-patronage, trade, and religion.6 Islamic
scripture formed the basis of government. Only the word of the
sultan, the spiritual and political leader of the Empire, rivaled the
6
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importance of the word of the Qur’an. As such, a mixture of
Islamic and dynastic law guided Ottoman courts and politics.7
However, by the seventeenth-century, the Empire lapsed into a
state of social, economic, and political decline. Newly
industrialized European nations bested Ottoman armies and
relentlessly chipped away at the edges of the Empire.
Simultaneously, the rise of nationalism amongst numerous subject
populations, such as the Serbians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and many
others, embroiled the Ottomans in a succession of intractable
rebellions. Ottoman leadership attempted to reverse the Empire’s
decline by westernizing the military, education systems, and
various facets of government. These reforms came to a head under
sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909), who hoped the creation of a
constitution and parliament might rejuvenate the Empire.8
However, his hopes would prove to be short lived. Instead of
reversing the Empire’s decline, the newly elected parliament
became paralyzed over the course of the government
administration.
Frustrated
with
parliamentary
inaction,
Abdulhamid II nullified the Constitution in 1878 and reclaimed
political authority, putting an end to the era of reform.9
A group of young Turkish soldiers and intellectuals,
however, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Ottoman
sultanate. They formed an influential movement called the Selanik
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also called the Young
Turks. In 1908, the Young Turks seized political authority by
forcing the sultan to reinstate the Constitution.10 From there, they
attempted to modernize the nation. Their efforts, however, had
little effect upon the overall health of the Empire. Political
instability shook Ottoman territories as the Young Turks struggled
to remain in power as those loyal to the sultanate rebelled against
their rule.11 The once powerful Ottoman Empire was hurtling
towards collapse; under pressure from both external adversaries
and internal political chaos. By the early twentieth-century,
Ottoman political and social stability grew so weak, European
7
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leaders joked that the Empire had become the “Sick Man of
Europe.”
In 1914, World War I erupted following the assassination
of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, by Serbian Nationalist Gavrilo Princip. When AustriaHungary and its ally Germany, hungry for revenge, declared war
on Serbia, the Ottoman Empire made the unfortunate decision to
side with them. The Ottoman military was ill prepared for war,
despite efforts to westernize its structure. This weakness forced the
Ottomans to withdraw from the conflict in October 1918.12
Following Allied victory over the Central Powers later that year,
the Ottomans hoped that the victors might show some respect for
their power and allow the Empire to retain its remaining territories.
Their hopes were dashed, however, when American President
Woodrow Wilson called for the dismemberment of Ottoman
territories along ethnic lines.13 The rest of the Allied Powers,
hungry for revenge against the Central Powers, offered terms that
were little better. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, British
Prime Minister Lloyd George demanded that the Ottomans be
expelled from Anatolia. French Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau spoke in similar language, stating that Ottoman rule
should be withdrawn.14 There seemed little hope that Ottoman
territories would remain intact. In 1920, the sultanate signed the
Treaty of Sevres, which divided the Empire between Turkish and
non-Turkish regions.15 In addition, the Allies divided western
Anatolia between Greece, Italy, and France. The European powers
immediately sent armies to secure these claims, aggravating the
local Turkish populations and leading to rising levels of Turkish
nationalism.16 In unoccupied Anatolia, nationalist resistance
formed to repel the occupiers. In response, the government
dispatched a young Turkish general named Mustafa Kemal to
suppress the rebellion.
Rather than carrying out his orders, Kemal rose to power as
leader of the resistance movement. For the next two years, he
12
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repelled attacks from foreign troops in Anatolia. These victories
earned Kemal and his resistance respect and prestige. Using this
newfound power, Kemal ordered the creation of a Grand National
Assembly, despite the Ottoman sultan’s attempts to thwart its
creation.17 Though fiercely anti-Islamist, Kemal appealed to the
religious authorities within the Assembly in order to gather further
support from the Islamic population. By 1921, Kemal gained
enough political leverage to introduce the Law of Fundamental
Organization, a twenty-three-article document that created a new
government in which sovereignty belonged “…without restriction
to the nation.”18 This led to the subsequent abolition of the
sultanate in 1922, thereby freeing Turkey from imperial control. In
October 1923, Kemal further utilized this political favor in order to
bring about the rebirth of Turkey as a Republic. The assembly
unanimously accepted his proposal, then subsequently elected
Kemal the first President of the fledgling Republic.

Ataturk: A Legacy of Westernization and Secularism
Mustafa Kemal’s election marked the beginning of an era of great
social, political, and religious reform within Turkey. Before the
Republic’s birth, Kemal disguised himself as an ardent supporter
of Islamic law and governance. In reality, however, Kemal
believed that religion stifled progress and “…loosened the national
ties of the Turkish nation.”19 Rather than studying Islamic scripture
for guidance, Kemal turned to European political and scientific
thought. He saw the Republic as a nation guided by scientism, and
popularly held theories of Turkish racial superiority, based upon
Darwinian evolutionary theory.20 Kemal believed that this blend of
western concepts formed the basis of a new type of nationalism,
which would prove more crucial to the formation of Turkish
identity than religion. Turkey could only survive if Turks
“…dismissed religion as an obsolete institution devised in a
bygone era.”21 Islam meant stagnation, and so Kemal sought to
eliminate it from government.
17

Hanioglu, Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography, 102.
Hanioglu, Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography, 115
19
Ibid., 132.
20
Ibid., 161.
21
Ibid., 162.
18

6

Unconditional Surrender

In 1926, Kemal declared the Seriat, or Muslim codes which
guided Ottoman legal processes, null and void.22 The old laws,
with their deep roots in Islamic scripture and tradition, were illadapted to modern life. In their place, Kemal’s Grand National
Assembly passed Civil Codes, Debt Laws, Penal Codes, and
Commercial Codes based upon Swiss, Italian, and German law.23
He further ordered the abolition of religious schools, as well as
courts based upon the Seriat, and banned ecclesiastical garb
outside mosques.24 In their stead, Kemal instituted a westernized
school system which taught a new Turkish script, courts based
upon the new established secular Turkish law, and western garb.25
In addition to education, legal, and clothing reform, Kemal pursued
the liberalization of women’s roles within the Republic. Ottoman
government, with its firm basis in Islamic scripture, prohibited
women from participation in government or some aspects of social
life. Kemal believed that in order for the Republic to progress,
women needed to be granted legal equality. Early in his
presidency, he ordered the creation of a commission dedicated to
granting women civil rights to achieve this objective.26 When the
Civil Codes were revised, legislators granted women a number of
freedoms, including equal rights in marriage, property holding, and
before the courts.27 In 1930, Kemal pushed the envelope further by
granting women the right to vote in elections and become village
leaders or members of city councils.28 National suffrage and the
right to run for office in the Grand National Assembly followed
five years later. As a result of these reforms, Turkish women
finally possessed a formal voice in social and governmental affairs.
The secularization of Turkish law, education, and
governance, were all major victories in Kemal’s campaign to
engineer a new Turkish identity. However, despite these successes,
Kemal’s transformation of the nation was not yet complete. This
new identity, Kemal believed, must be celebrated. In 1934, Kemal
determined that Turkish names, like the nation, should be
22
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westernized, and all Turkish citizens were required by law to adopt
hereditary surnames. At first glance, the introduction of surnames
may seem ephemeral compared to Kemal’s legal and legislative
reforms, but its cultural significance should not be ignored.
Throughout history, the vast majority of Turks had simply been
known by titles or first names. The introduction of surnames
represented the wholesale adoption of a western cultural tradition
into the personal life of every Turk. More importantly, new
surnames were required to be Turkish, and not reference tribal or
foreign origin, in order to help solidify the republic’s nascent
national identity. The Turkish people granted Kemal a surname
that reflected his place in citizens’ hearts—Ataturk, or “Father
Turk.”29 This act emphasized the liberation of the Republic from
its Ottoman heritage, symbolizing a new beginning for the Turkish
people.
In summary, Ataturk’s rise to power marked an era of
profound social, political, and religious reformation within Turkey.
He drew on his study of western political and scientific thought in
order to methodically build a framework for a new nation. Ataturk
struck down Islamic religious code and ecclesiastical dress,
replacing them with laws based on European systems of
governance and Western garb. He closed religious schools, granted
women legal equality, and pioneered the creation of a new Turkish
script. These reforms resulted in both the creation of a new Turkish
identity and the liberation of the Republic from its Ottoman roots.

The Republic of Turkey: Democracy and Parliament
During the Turkish War of Independence, the Law of Fundamental
Organization served as the unofficial Constitution of Turkey. By
1923, however, Ataturk knew the document needed expansion in
order to delineate the powers allotted to each branch of the new
nation’s government. Thus, Ataturk and the Grand National
Assembly used the Law of Fundamental Organization as the basis
of a new code of laws that would serve as the Republic’s
permanent Constitution. In order to build a strong and lasting
system of governance, Ataturk carefully examined the structural
weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire. The first weakness, he
29
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determined, was religion. Religion, he believed, stagnated the
technological and political progress of the Empire, thereby leading
to its eventual downfall. Secularization of social customs and
government solved this problem. The Empire’s second weakness,
Ataturk believed, was the fact that Ottomans did not allow the
common individual a voice in the nation’s future. Under the old
system, the sultan possessed absolute authority over the
governmental and spiritual direction of the Empire. Next in power
were the social and religious elite, whose authority was, in turn,
determined by their proximity to the sultan. At the bottom of
Ottoman society were the Empire’s citizens, separated from the
sultan by a vast social and bureaucratic divide. They possessed no
voice in Ottoman governance and lived in accordance with laws set
not by themselves, but by the elite. Because the Empire took little
interest in the common people, they eventually became dissatisfied
by the established order and rebelled. The Republic could not
make the same mistake. Common men and women needed to be
engaged in government. This meant the system not only needed to
be a secular one, but one that allowed the Turkish people a voice in
their nation’s future. Therefore, in Ataturk’s estimate, democracy
was an essential cornerstone to ensure the success and longevity of
the new Republic.
Democracy, however, could not exist without a proper
governing body. Political authority could not belong to one
individual, such as the Ottoman sultan. During the Turkish War of
Independence, the Grand National Assembly served as wartime
government, with Ataturk serving as its political leader. Ataturk
decided, the Assembly would continue to be the nation’s governing
body, with powers delineated by new laws. Members of the
Assembly would not be members of the aristocracy or chosen by
proximity to Ataturk. Instead, the Turkish people elected
representatives. This reflected the new government’s dedication to
not only democracy, but to the sovereignty of the people. There
existed no social or bureaucratic distance between citizens and
their elected officials. Turks were now directly involved with the
social and political future of the nation in a manner that had not
been possible under the Ottoman system of governance. These
objectives, would ultimately become the ideological basis of the
1924 Constitution.

The 1924 Constitution: Role of the President, Parliament
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and Prime Minister
The 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey represents the
nation’s revolutionary transformation from the rigid, religious
monarchy of the Ottoman Empire to the secular democracy of the
Republic of Turkey. In order to better understand the significance
of 2017’s revised Constitution, one must examine elements of the
original Constitution in detail, namely sections pertaining to the
President of the Republic, the Turkish Parliament, and the Prime
Minister. In essence, the 1924 Constitution transformed Turkey
into a parliamentary republic.
The 1924 Constitution provides detailed instruction on the
selection of the President as well as the powers attributed to the
office. Section one of the Constitution states that legislative and
executive powers are vested in the Grand National Assembly. The
Assembly exercises executive authority through the President of
the Republic and his Cabinet.30 The President, therefore, is not the
center of executive power—the Grand National Assembly is.31
Section three summarizes the President’s selection and his role.
The members of the Assembly elect the President for the period of
a parliamentary term. The President cannot take part in discussions
or deliberations of the Assembly or vote upon any issue.
Furthermore, it is the President’s duty to promulgate laws voted by
Assembly, as well as to veto any laws which he does not consider
favorable for Turkey’s future. The Assembly may, however,
overrule the President’s veto through a majority vote.32 Though the
Grand National Assembly possesses supreme command of the
military, it exercises its command over the armed forces through
the office of the President. In times of peace, however, the military
resides in the care of the Chief of Staff. Though the President
nominates the Chief of Staff, the nominee cannot assume office
without the approval of the Grand National Assembly.33 The
President also chooses the President of the Council of
Commissioners (the Prime Minister) from the members of the

30
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Grand National Assembly.34 In accordance with its founding
principle of democracy, the 1924 Constitution grants a majority of
executive power to the Grand National Assembly, not the
President. The Presidency was, therefore, a largely ceremonial
head of state. True legislative and executive power rested in the
hands of the Parliament and Prime Minister.
In addition to clearly delineating the powers granted to the
Presidency, the 1924 Constitution outlines the selection of
members of the Turkish Parliament, or Grand National Assembly,
as well as the duties and limits of its power. In section one, the
Constitution states that the Grand National Assembly is “the sole
lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the
name of the nation.”35 Furthermore, legislative and executive
powers are “vested and centered” in the Assembly.36 The
electorate, therefore, grants the Assembly its considerable political
power.
Section two states that Assembly members are elected in
accordance with electoral law. This means they cannot be
individuals who are in service to a foreign power, those
condemned to penal service, those acknowledging foreign
nationality, those condemned for bankruptcy, those deprived of
their civil rights, or those who cannot read and write in Turkish.37
The Grand National Assembly also possesses the power of
“interpellation” and of “conducting investigations and
parliamentary inquiries.”38 This tenant of the Constitution gives the
Assembly the right to submit questions to the government. In cases
where an authority such as the President acts in an undesirable
way, the Assembly may hold a vote of confidence or institute a
change in government. Article twenty-six states the Assembly
“makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws” and “concludes
conventions and treaties of peace with other states.”39 Furthermore,
the Assembly is responsible for declarations of war, examining and
ratifying documents by the Commission on the Budget, coining
money, and accepting or rejecting contracts or concessions
34
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involving financial responsibility.40 Under the 1924 Constitution,
the Grand National Assembly held the majority of legislative and
executive power as well as control over economic, judicial, and
diplomatic affairs. Due to their status as elected representatives of
the Turkish people, the concentration of power within the
Assembly reflected one of the Constitution’s key principles—
democracy.
The Prime Minister’s selection process as well as the
powers and limits of the role are, like those of President and
Parliament, detailed within the 1924 Constitution. In Mead Earle’s
translation, he refers to the Prime Minister as the “President of the
Council of Commissioners.” In the Constitution’s third section, it
states that the President of the Republic chooses the President of
the Council “from among the deputies,” or members of the
Assembly.41 After being selected by the President, the Prime
Minister nominates other members of the Council. The President
must then approve these choices. If the President approves of the
selection, he presents the list of prospective candidates to the
Assembly. The Assembly deliberates over the list for a week, then
determines whether or not it will accept or reject the nominated
individuals.42 The Constitution then goes into detail about the
duties of the Prime Minister. According to article forty-six, the
Council of Commissioners is “collectively responsible for the
general policies of government.”43 Additionally, each member is
“responsible within the scope of his authority for the general
character of his policy and the actions of his subordinates.”44
This means the Prime Minister and the rest of the
Commissioners are responsible for the smooth function of
government administration. The end of section three states that, in
tandem with a Council of State, the Council of Commissioners
shall “promulgate regulations for the administration and execution
of the law, provided that such regulation shall not contain new
clauses.”45 The 1924 Constitution paints the role of Prime Minister
as one responsible for the function and maintenance of
40
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government. While the President represents the nation on the
national level, the Prime Minister works to ensure that the
Republic functions according to the letter of the law. Due to the
nature of the office, the Prime Minister holds a more active role in
the governance of the nation than the President. The Prime
Minister like the President, however, is still beholden to the Grand
National Assembly, and in turn, the people of Turkey. The Prime
Minister, like President and Parliament, ultimately derives its
power from the citizenry.
The 1924 Constitution clearly defines the role of President,
Parliament, and Prime Minister within the nation. The Presidency
possesses a minimal role within Turkish government. The
President’s duty is to promulgate laws voted on by the assembly,
veto any laws considered unfavorable for Turkey’s future, and
select the Prime Minister from amongst the members of the Grand
National Assembly. He cannot discuss important issues, nor can he
vote on them. The Grand National Assembly, unlike the
Presidency, plays an active role within Turkey’s government. The
Grand National Assembly may conduct interpellation, make,
amend, interpret, or abrogate laws, declare war, coin money, or
accept or reject contracts or concessions involving financial
responsibility. The Prime Minister, like Parliament, plays a larger
role in the Republic’s governance than the President. The Prime
Minister oversees the smooth function and maintenance of
government as well as promulgating regulations for the
administration and execution of the law.

The Referendum and the Revised Constitution
In December 2016, Turkey’s AKP unveiled a new Constitution,
henceforth referred to as the revised, or 2017 Constitution. The
document introduced eighteen amendments, which drastically alter
the structure of the Turkish government.46 To understand changes
to the Turkish Constitution, it is necessary to examine the revised
Constitution’s background, and its eighteen amendments, in
comparison to its 1924 predecessor. The revised Constitution
eliminates the role of Prime Minister and transfers the office’s
executive power to the Presidency, greatly expands the President’s
authority, and weakens the Turkish Parliament. This drastic
46
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departure from the 1924 Constitution threatens to greatly amplify
the power of the Presidency whilst simultaneously weakening
other branches of government, particularly the legislature.
The 2017 Constitution radically changes the manner of
Presidential election as well as the manner in which the office
functions. Instead of the Grand National Assembly electing the
president from among its members, the President is now elected by
direct popular vote. Presidential elections must be held in
conjunction with the Assembly’s elections.47 The 1924
Constitution states that legislative and executive power are vested
in the Grand National Assembly.48 The 2017 Constitution changes
this. Article 104 states that “executive authority belongs to the
President.”49 Further, the revised document transfers the executive
authority, and duties formerly invested in the office of Prime
Minister to the Presidency. This includes power to appoint and
dismiss ministers, high level public executives, and senior public
officials. The 2017 Constitution further strengthens the Presidency
by granting it the power to issue presidential decrees or by-laws to
ensure the implementation of law.50 More ominously, the
document also contains a section pertaining to the administration
of states of emergency, which does not exist in the 1924
Constitution. According to article 119, the President may issue a
state of emergency in the event of war, situations necessitating
war, uprisings, spread of violent and strong rebellious actions, or
the widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the
order established by the Constitution.51 Additionally, the
Presidency is no longer bound by law to remain politically neutral,
meaning that a President may retain ties to his political party.52 The
2017 Constitution enormously expands the powers allotted to the
President of Turkey. It transfers much of the executive authority
granted to the Grand National Assembly and Prime Minister under
the 1924 Constitution to the President. In essence, the President
47
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has ceased to be a ceremonial office, and has become the unrivaled
center of executive authority.53
The 2017 revised Constitution also changed the manner in
which members of the Grand National Assembly are chosen, and
severely limited the scope of its powers, Particularly its role as a
watchdog against corruption and counterbalance to presidential
power. The Grand National Assembly’s longstanding powers of
interpolation, and parliamentary investigation have been
removed.5455 Consequently, the Assembly no longer possesses the
power to check the Presidency or root out corruption within the
governing administration. Likewise, the Assembly’s power to
override Presidential vetoes has been strictly curtailed. The 1924
Constitution enabled the Assembly to overrule a President’s veto
through a majority vote of all present members.56 Conversely, the
2017 Constitution requires an absolute majority of all members of
the Assembly to overcome a veto.57 Thereby effectively nullifying
the Assembly’s ability to overturn a Presidential veto in the
foreseeable future, given the ruling AKP’s substantial
parliamentary majority.
In addition to its overt efforts to limit the power of the
Assembly, the 2017 Constitution also places new restrictions on
who is eligible to seek election to the Assembly. The 1924
Constitution barred criminals from running for office, as many
nations do, but the 2017 document also bars individuals with ties to
the military.58 To outside observers, this stipulation may seem
strange. However, in light of Turkey’s long history of military
involvement in politics, the provision is clearly intended to limit
the political influence of the military, and by extension its ability to
oppose the ruling party.
To summarize, the 2017 Constitution radically reshapes the
Turkish political landscape. The Grand National Assembly has
ceased to be a political powerhouse and has been reduced to a
largely ceremonial body. Meanwhile, the President has become a
53
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powerful executive, beyond the reach of parliamentary checks and
balances, and the AKP’s grip on power has been strengthened
considerably. In light of these reforms, it is readily apparent just
how far modern Turkey has departed from the legacy of Ataturk.
The spirit of democracy and popular sovereignty that underpinned
the 1924 Constitution is in full retreat. Erdogan’s new political
order controls the future of Turkey.

The Dangers of the Revised Constitution
With Erdogan’s new order in full ascendancy, the question
remains, what are the dangers posed by the President’s expanded
executive authority, and the commensurate decline of
parliamentary checks and balances? The first problem posed by the
new Constitution stems from the President's ability to appoint and
dismiss vice presidents, ministers, high level public executives,
and senior public officials. This power allows the President to clear
important offices of political rivals and replace them with members
of his own political party. The President then holds direct sway
over these new appointments, thereby creating powerful pawns in
critical government departments. The 2017 Constitution creates
further difficulties by no longer requiring the President to maintain
political neutrality. This means the President may act as the leader
of a political party.59 This is dangerous since, under the Turkish
political party system, it would enable the President to decide who
runs on his party’s ticket in parliamentary elections. If the
President’s party controls the majority of seats in the Grand
National Assembly, the President could, in effect, control the
Assembly as well as its agenda. The end result is the total
deterioration of governmental checks and balances.60 The greatest
threat posed by the revised Constitution, however, originates from
the President’s ability to make decrees that carry the full force of
the law. So long as the President makes decrees that are not in
conflict with “the provisions of the law,” he can make any decree
he wishes.
In addition to the threats posed by the expanded role of the
Presidency, the revised Constitution further undermines Turkish
democracy through the weakening of the Grand National
59
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Assembly and its decreased capacity to check the Presidency. The
revised Constitution abolishes the Assembly’s right to
interpellation. In the past, interpellation allowed the Assembly to
routinely monitor the function of government. If the Assembly
discovered illegal or corrupt activity, they could hold a vote of
confidence and remove a corrupt official from office.61 The loss of
interpellation means that the Assembly has been stripped of its
watchdog role within government. This, in turn, enables corrupt
officials to abuse their power without fear of reprisal. Some
Turkish politicians state that interpellation is not necessary since
the people of Turkey directly elect the President. They argue that
any action undertaken by the President is, therefore, the will of the
people.62 This argument is flawed. Just because the Turkish people
grant the President executive authority does not mean that the
President will act in the best interest of the nation. It is important
for the Grand National Assembly, whose members are also
appointed through direct election, to possess the ability to expose
and punish the abuse of executive power. Another problem posed
by the revised Constitution is the fact that in order to overcome a
President’s veto, it is now necessary for an absolute majority of all
members of the Assembly to vote to overturn the veto. This new
tenant of the Constitution weakens the Assembly’s ability to stop
controversial legislation. So long as the President’s party holds the
political majority in the Grand National Assembly, it is nearly
impossible to overturn a veto.
The passage of the revised Constitution exposes Turkish
democracy to a host of new challenges. The document grants
unprecedented executive power to the President, allowing him to
retain party ties, make sweeping presidential decrees, dismiss and
appoint powerful officials at will, and potentially dominate the
Grand National Assembly’s agenda. The Assembly now lacks the
power to check the President’s expanded authority. The removal of
the right to interpellation prevents the Assembly from routinely
probing the government for corruption and illegal actions. In
addition, the revision of the conditions needed to overturn a veto
61
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makes it difficult for the Assembly to overrule the President’s
decision should his party possess a political majority. This system
allows for the exploitation of the people of Turkey, should the
public elect a corrupt individual to serve as President.

Who is Recep Tayyip Erdogan
It is necessary to delve into President Erdogan’s personal beliefs,
statements, and political history to understand why the unchecked
expansion of executive power under the revised Constitution poses
a threat to the Republic’s status as a secular democracy. Erdogan,
like Ataturk, came from relatively humble origins and gained
authority through political savvy and determination. Erdogan’s
political career began in the early 1990s as part of the Islamist
Welfare Party.63 The citizens of Istanbul elected him to the office
of Mayor in 1994, after he promised to improve sanitation,
increase water quality, and decrease traffic congestion. In 2001,
Erdogan founded the Justice and Development party (AKP).64 The
AKP gained remarkable traction under his leadership, claiming
victory in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections. Shortly thereafter,
Erdogan was elected Prime Minister of Turkey. As Prime Minister,
he promised to combat corruption, open the Turkish economy to
competition, and improve schools as well as sanitation in the
Republic’s poorest areas.65 On the whole, Erdogan kept his
promises. He directed billions of dollars toward development
projects and led the Turkish economy to become the eighteenth
largest in the world.66 Corruption, however, remains rife within
Turkey’s government, though it has been “democratized.” These
political victories made Erdogan popular with the Turkish public
and carried him to the office of the Presidency in 2014. Erdogan’s
meteoric rise to power and popularity with the Turkish public are a
strange mirror to Ataturk’s own political story. This parallel,
however, is where similarities between the two men end.
Unlike Ataturk, who saw Turkey’s Ottoman past as a
shameful footnote in Turkic history, Erdogan ardently admires the
63
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Ottoman Empire. Following the AKP’s 2011 election triumph,
Erdogan called the election a victory for Turkey and its Ottoman
heritage.67 A year later, he praised the contributions of those who
would raise a generation that would “reach the level of our
Ottoman and Seljuk ancestors.”68 During 2015 general elections,
Erdogan even ordered the commission of a “Conquest Unit.” This
unit, dressed as Ottoman Janissary soldiers and nearly five hundred
strong, accompanied Erdogan on May 30th during a campaign
speech in Istanbul’s Yenikapi square. An Ottoman Mehter, or
military band, accompanied the soldiers.69 In addition to verbal and
visual displays of his admiration for the Empire, Erdogan is
politically aligned with a number of Turkish politicians seeking to
recapture Turkey’s Ottoman past. One such individual is Ahmet
Davutoglu, Erdogan’s former foreign policy advisor. In 2001,
Davutoglu published a book called Strategic Depth: Turkey’s
International Position, which argued that Turkey’s strategic depth
is derived not from its geostrategic location and historical legacy as
the Republic, but that of the Ottoman Empire.70 In addition, upon
his election to the office of Prime Minister, Davutolgu swore to
“bring the order and justice of the Ottoman Empire to today’s
world.”71 His controversial statements and questionable foreign
policy led the opposition to brand Davutoglu, and by extension,
Erdogan, neo-Ottoman or imperialist.
The differences between Erdogan and Ataturk do not end in
their conflicting perspectives regarding Ottoman history. Though
Ataturk initially presented himself as an ally of Islamic
governance, he was, in reality, the opposite. The integration of
Islam into law and governance, Ataturk believed, led to stagnation.
This stagnation made the Ottomans unable to keep up with
westernized nations and led to the Empire’s eventual collapse. This
reasoning, Ataturk believed, justified his secularization of the
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Republic’s government, courts, education systems, and social
customs. Not only is Erdogan a devout Muslim, but his past and
present political history indicates his support for the integration of
Islamic law into Turkey’s governmental system. In his youth,
Erdogan joined the Islamist National Salvation Party, or MSP.
When the party was forced to rebrand itself as the Welfare Party
following the 1980 Turkish coup, Erdogan followed.72 Erdogan
became the party’s rising star and was the star pupil of the party’s
leader, renowned Islamic politician Necmettin Erbakan. During his
tenure as Prime Minister, Erbakan challenged the Republic’s proWestern, secular roots and attempted to draw closer relations with
Arab states. Erbakan’s fiery criticism of the established
government led to his subsequent removal power by the Turkish
military in 1997.73 Erdogan was caught in the crossfire when he
voiced protest against his mentor’s removal, reciting a poem
declaring that “the mosques are our barracks, the domes our
helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our
soldiers.”74Authorities arrested Erdogan, then tried him shortly
thereafter. The court, believing his speech a threat to the
established secular order, sentenced Erdogan to ten months in
prison.
Following his release, Erdogan rebranded himself as a
politician able to successfully reconcile Islam with democracy. His
supporters state that Erdogan is no longer a young, Islamist radical.
Rather, he aims to liberate religious Turkish peoples from the
constraints and discrimination inflicted upon them by Ataturk’s
secular legacy.75 The truth is, however, that Erdogan merely
became more skilled in concealing his true convictions. During his
tenure as Prime Minister, Erdogan steadily promoted Islam
throughout the Turkish bureaucracy and education systems. He
called on schools to raise a “new religious generation” and
promote a more religious Turkey.76 In 2004, Erdogan stated that he
sympathized with Palestinian terror organization Hamas. When
72
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Hamas won the Palestinian elections, Erdogan warmly welcomed
its leadership to Turkey.77 Hamas, however, is not the only Islamist
organization that Erdogan supports. Over the years, Erdogan
repeatedly voiced his approval of the Muslim Brotherhood. When
the Brotherhood’s leader, Mohamed Morsi, won in the Egyptian
elections, Erdogan received warm reception in Cairo. In the years
after, Erdogan worked closely with Morsi, signing a one billiondollar loan to Egypt. When the Egyptian military overthrew Morsi
in 2013, Erdogan called the move “unacceptable” and demanded
Morsi’s release as well as his restoration to power.78 Erdogan’s
support for radical Islamist organizations, however, is not the only
indication that his convictions remain unchanged. Despite this fact,
the Republic made little effort to expand the rights of religious
minorities. Government authorities aggressively utilize Turkish
Penal Code to silence critics of Islam.79 In one such case, a twitter
user named Ertan P. received fifteen months in prison for tweets
mocking Islam.80 Many individuals see Erdogan’s support for
Islamist organizations and his government’s use of Turkish law to
silence critics of Islam as an indication of his dedication not only
to Islam, but also its integration into law.
To many Turkish politicians who still believe in secular
government and Ataturk’s legacy, President Erdogan represents an
existential threat to Turkish democracy. His admiration for the
Ottoman past, radical Islamist leanings, as well as ties to neoOttoman and Islamist politicians deviate profoundly from
Ataturk’s pro-western, secularist tendencies. Though their policies
may differ, both men are surprisingly similar not only in their
respective rises to political power, but in their charisma, skilled
oration, and political cunning. In the words of one Turkish citizen,
if Ataturk had an evil twin, it would be Erdogan since his “views
are mirror opposites of Ataturk’s” and that he is “the first
overwhelming, larger-than-life figure in Turkish Public life since
the Ghazi [Ataturk] himself.”81 In many ways, Erdogan is the
Turkish Republic’s Anti-Ataturk.
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Erdogan’s War: The 2016 Coup and Purge
In order to accurately forecast Turkey’s future under Erdogan, it is
not only necessary to examine where Erdogan’s personal
convictions deviate from Ataturk’s in regard to Turkey as a secular
nation-state, but to examine Erdogan’s respect or lack thereof for
the freedom, democracy, and sovereignty of the Turkish people.
Nowhere has Erdogan made his position clearer than in his
handling of alleged political dissidents in the wake of the 2016
Turkish coup.
On July 15, 2016, a flight of Turkish fighter jets took off in
the skies over Ankara while Turkish Army tanks stopped traffic on
the bridges linking the European and Asian portions of Istanbul.
Rebels launched raids on a number of critical government
compounds, including the General Staff Headquarters and police
Special Forces base.82 At 11:00 p.m., the Turkish government
declared the raids an act of insurrection. An hour later, Erdogan
called on the public to rally against the insurrectionists and take
back Ataturk Airport. In response, eighty-thousand mosques urged
their attendees to action.83 Citizens threw their bodies in front of
tank treads and called for the rebels to put their weapons down. In
some areas, the insurrectionists gave up their arms. In others,
protesters were shot, run over by tanks, or violently beaten. On
July 16, the rebels attempted to seize the parliament building, the
National Intelligence Agency, as well as Erdogan’s hotel in
Marmaris. They found the establishment empty, as Erdogan had
already departed for Istanbul.84 The insurrectionists attempted to
maintain control over captured areas but failed as resistance grew.
Police rallied to the public’s cause and subdued a majority of the
rebels. By the coup’s end, five anti-coup soldiers, sixty-two police
officers, and one hundred seventy-three civilians lay dead while
thousands more suffered injuries.85
In the coup’s wake, the Turkish government placed blame
for the coup on Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher and
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businessman living in exile in the United States. Gulen was once
Erdogan’s close associate and was instrumental in the AKP’s
struggle to end military influence in Turkish politics.86 As a result,
many of Gulen’s followers gained key positions in Turkish
government, despite the fact that Gulen himself was not a member
of the AKP. However, Gulen’s tremendous influence and
Erdogan’s boundless ambition soon drew the two men into
conflict. In 2013, a corruption investigation resulted in the arrest of
many business people and bureaucrats tied to the AKP by Gulenist
police officers.87 Tensions rapidly escalated between the AKP and
Gulen’s followers, resulting in the mass arrest of Gulenists as well
as Gulen’s flight to the United States. The conflict angered
Erdogan, who claimed that those behind the corruption
investigations sought to overthrow the established order. From that
moment onward, Erdogan and the AKP devoted a massive amount
of resources to eradicate Gulen and any remaining Gulenists from
the Turkish political sphere. In the years following the Gulenist
Uprising, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT)
conducted numerous investigations into Gulen and his disciples.88
In addition, Erdogan attempted to negotiate with United States
authorities for Gulen’s extradition to Turkey, though his efforts
proved a failure. Members of the Erdogan administration claimed
that the 2016 coup materialized as a result of Gulenists’ fears that
the government investigation into their questionable actions came
to an end, and that members of the movement would soon be
arrested.89 Gulen, however, denied any culpability, stating that
Erdogan intended to use the coup as an excuse to seize power and
“build a dictatorship.”90 Erdogan, Turkish intelligence agencies,
and even the AKP’s opposition denied Gulen’s accusation. Instead,
they continued to place blame upon Gulen and various intelligence
failures in the months leading up to the coup.91
The attempted coup shook the Turkish public to its core
and created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity across the nation.
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For his part, Erdogan preyed upon these fears, seizing the
opportunity to claim more power. On July 22, 2016, the Turkish
government declared a state of emergency “to be able to remove
swiftly all the elements of the terrorist organization involved in the
coup attempt.”92 The state of emergency expanded the scope of
Presidential power within Turkey considerably, effectively
allowing Erdogan and his officials to crack down on those they
deemed responsible. Although a number of citizens spoke out
against the expansion of Presidential power, the general public
possessed little recourse against the massively expanded
emergency powers of the AKP government. Attempting to ease the
people’s concerns, government promised life would be no different
than it was before. The state of emergency would simply allow for
a peaceful transition to normality.93 Reality, however, was the
opposite.
Over the next several weeks, Turkish courts placed tens of
thousands of suspects under arrest on charges of links to Gulen.
These suspects, however, were not corrupt businessmen or
Gulenist politicians. The accused ranged from military officials,
pilots, police officers, and civil servants, to academics and
teachers.94 By December 2016, the government sacked or
suspended more than one hundred thousand individuals, with
thirty-seven thousand more arrested. When the public questioned
the government’s speedy arrest of those related to the coup,
officials claimed that the nation’s intelligence agencies
investigated Gulen and his followers for more than two years,
allowing for the swift identification of guilty individuals.95 In
addition, officials stated mass arrests were necessary in order to
“root out all coup supporters from the state apparatus.”96 For a
time, Erdogan’s declared state of emergency and the subsequent
arrests of suspected Gulenists seemed justified. Erdogan appeared
to practice extreme caution, detaining only those he perceived as a
threat to the stability of the Republic. However, a number of
disturbing reports emerged, detailing Erdogan’s abuse of the
powers granted to him by the state of emergency. Suspected
92
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Gulenists were not the Turkish government’s only victims. The
crackdown widened to target media outlets, the Turkish
intelligentsia, and even ordinary citizens critical of Erdogan and
the established government. Erdogan’s internal security campaign
had become a purge of all elements within Turkish society who
resisted his political agenda, regardless of their actual ties to
Fethullah Gulen.
Though dozens of media outlets were shut down on
suspicion of links to the Gulenist movement, the global community
grew increasingly concerned over Erdogan’s actions as rumors
surfaced regarding the arrest or elimination of individuals and
establishments unrelated to the Gulenist movement. The
government targeted and shut down a number of media
organizations that expressed their dissatisfaction with the Erdogan
or the AKP’s policies. In addition, Erdogan jailed journalists or
removed them from their jobs. Over 140 newspapers, magazines,
and television channels were banned. In addition, the government
detained over 150 journalists. One such individual is Asli Erdogan,
a celebrated Turkish writer and member of the advisory board for a
pro-Kurdish newspaper known as Ozgur Gundem.97 In August
2016, Special Forces broke into Ms. Erdogan’s house in the middle
of the night. “They were dressed as if they were going to war.
Bulletproof vests, automatic weapons,” Ms. Erdogan recalled.98
The soldiers arrested Ms. Erdogan on charges of disrupting the
unity and integrity of the state, spreading terror propaganda, as
well as being a member of the Kurdish militant group, the PKK.99
Ms. Erdogan was flabbergasted. Though she wrote columns on
torture, prison, Kurdish issues, and women’s rights, she never
expected to be arrested for expressing her opinion. She denied all
charges, stating that she committed no crime other than “being an
adviser to a newspaper.”100 The court refused to listen to Ms.
Erdogan and jailed her. Prison conditions were hellish. Ms.
Erdogan spent three days in an eight square meter cell with no
facilities, after which officers moved her to solitary
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confinement.101 There, the jailers neglected her care, declining to
offer basic amenities such as drinking water.102 Ms. Erdogan grew
so weak, she was unable to walk. Though authorities eventually
released Ms. Erdogan, she could still face life imprisonment if
found guilty at her next hearing. Since her release, Ms. Erdogan
has not written a single article. Memories of imprisonment silenced
her pen. “I have been released but I do not feel free,” she
confessed, “in Turkey, one would need to be very naïve to feel
free.”103
Ms. Erdogan and the media, however, are not the only
victims of the crackdown. At the start of his administration,
President Erdogan and the AKP introduced a series of educational
reforms, which led to the adoption of a more conservative
curriculum.104 These reforms included the removal of evolutionary
theory, the inclusion of extensive religious classes, as well as the
addition of the coup into social history classes.105 The new
curriculum placed less emphasis upon the founding of the Republic
and the early Republican years, and more emphasis upon the
transition to a multiparty democracy and the rise of center-right
politics.106 After the coup, universities dismissed over one
thousand academics and accused them of being members of the
Gulenist movement.107 The truth, however, is that these dismissals
were part of a “political witch hunt” intended to eliminate the
AKP’s political rivals. In response to both the removal of valuable
teachers and researchers from their positions, as well as academic
censorship, Turkish professors and students joined in resistance
against the government.108 At Ankara University, a group of
professors attempted to enter the campus. When the police stopped
them, they took off their academic robes and laid them before the
policemen.109 In other areas, Professors opened tents to teach
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courses not only to students, but to the community as well.110
In addition to his efforts to censor academia and the media,
Erdogan also aims to silence citizens who criticize his policies, as
well as those possessing vague connections to the Gulenist
movement. One such victim is Sezgin Yurkadel, a ferry worker.
One morning, Yurkadel’s superiors called him to a meeting at the
Greater Istanbul Municipality’s ferry line administration.111 They
presented Yurkadel with a stack of documents from his daughter’s
school as well as copies of his bank statements. Yurkadel’s
employers pointed out that Yurkadel’s daughter attended a school
run by Gulen’s followers.112 In addition, Yurkadel was a patron of
Bank Asya, an institution run by Gulenists until the government
seized it in 2015. This close association with Gulenist institutions,
the employers surmised, must mean that Yurkadel and his family
were themselves Gulenists.113 Yurkadel attempted to argue against
these accusations, pointing out that the Ministry of Education
certified his daughter’s school and that his employer deposited
educational assistance into his account at Bank Asya, which was
one of Turkey’s largest banks.114 He stated that he chose Asya
because it followed the traditional Islamic banking principles of
not paying interest. Yurkadel’s employers remained unconvinced
and fired him. In the time since, Yurkadel applied for over twenty
jobs without success. His supposed Gulenist ties, no matter how
distant, exiled him to the fringes of Turkish society.115 Sadly,
Yurkadel is merely one of thousands of cases of state sponsored
ostracization on the grounds of alleged Gulenist ties in Turkey
today.
On the night of the coup, twenty-three-year-old air force
trainee Yusuf Yamandag was stationed at a training camp located a
few hours away from Istanbul.116 In the midst of drills, one of
Yamandag’s superiors ordered the trainees onto a bus, armed them,
then ordered them to Istanbul to help police counter the Gulenist
110
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threat. Protesters stopped the bus before it reached the city and
arrested the trainees. The government later charged Yamandag and
his comrades with the attempted assassination of the President as
well as conspiring to dismantle the Republic.117 Yamandag’s
family insists that their son is innocent, despite government
allegations that the Air Force Academy was filled with Gulen
sympathizers. Like Yurkadel, Turkish citizens labeled the
Yamandag family as undesirable and ostracized them.118 The
family’s neighbors and friends refuse to associate with them, while
those on the street verbally abuse them.
The bloodshed and terror surrounding the failed 2016 coup
spurred nationwide paranoia about Turkey’s political stability.
Erdogan harnessed these insecurities to initiate a massive power
grab and enact an extensive purge intended to silence political
dissent across the nation. Erdogan’s actions demonstrate his
flagrant lack of respect toward the rights and sovereignty of the
Turkish people. One can surmise that with the expanded powers
granted to him by the revised Constitution, Erdogan’s purge will
not only continue, but grow in scope.

The Writing on the Wall
Erdogan’s power grab in the wake of the 2016 coup, and
subsequent purge are not the only indications of his blatant
disregard for popular sovereignty. In his attempt to distance
himself from his past as a fire-tongued pro-Islamist politician,
Erdogan rebranded himself as a democratic reformer bent on
eliminating entrenched corruption. This reinvention of his image
was largely successful. Erdogan’s rebellious past, including his
criminal history, were erased from public memory. The Turkish
public believed Erdogan to be a political moderate, far removed
from the youthful radical arrested for reciting Islamist poetry in the
wake of his Islamist mentor’s removal from office. Regardless of
his closely managed ‘moderate’ political persona, the truth is very
different. Close analysis of a number of Erdogan’s contentious
statements following his political rebirth, reveal that Erdogan is not
as far removed from his political past as he claims. Rather, they
reveal a man with little respect for democracy and freedom of
117
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speech.
Following the detainment of thousands of suspected
Gulenists, academics, and Erdogan’s political opponents by the
Turkish police, Erdogan made several concerning statements
regarding freedom and democracy in Turkey. In a speech to local
politicians in Ankara, Erdogan criticized those concerned with the
erosion of liberty and democracy as a result of his national state of
emergency. Erdogan declare that “For us, these phrases [freedom
and democracy] have absolutely no value any longer.”119 He went
on to argue in favor of prosecuting journalists, lawyers, and
politicians allied with the Gulenist movement or PKK as
terrorists.120 Nor is this the first time Erdogan vocalized his
disregard for democracy. In the midst of the reinvention of his
political identity, Erdogan stated that “democracy is like a train.
We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want.”121 This
statement demonstrates that Erdogan’s present disregard for
secular democracy is not a recent development, but an integral part
of his political identity; skillfully hidden through careful posturing.
In addition to concerning statements regarding democracy,
Erdogan also made clear his disdain for freedom of speech. In
2014, Erdogan, then Prime Minister, was the subject of a large
scandal which uncovered corruption within his administration. The
story spread like wildfire through social media platforms like
Twitter and YouTube and dealt a severe blow to Erdogan’s
credibility. Erdogan, angered by the evidence, set out to wage war
on social media. Later that year, Erdogan acquired a court order
which allowed him to ban Twitter from the Republic.122
The Turkish people rose in protest against Erdogan’s
decision, claiming it infringed upon freedom of speech. Despite
public protests, Erdogan remained unsympathetic. He argued that
119
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the charges of corruption mounted against him were false, and that
they never would have spread had it not been for social media. He
expressed his desire to expand the ban to YouTube, Facebook, and
other social media platforms.123 Erdogan’s Twitter crusade is not
the only piece of evidence that displays his distrust, or even hatred,
for freedom of speech. In the same year as his controversial
Twitter ban, Erdogan addressed the Committee to Protect
Journalists, or CPJ, at Ankara’s International Press Institute. He
defended his government’s regulation of internet information, by
stating that his laws made online media “safer and more free.”124
The day before, however, he told the CPJ that the “media should
have never been given the liberty to insult.” In addition, he stated
he was “increasingly against the internet everyday.”125 This attack
on social media, online information, as well as the press displays
Erdogan’s total lack of respect and distaste for free speech.
Though Erdogan succeeded in reinventing himself as a
moderate Islamic politician, dedicated to the elimination of
corruption and the defense of democracy within the Turkish
government. Erdogan’s political statements, continue to suggest
the opposite. Erdogan holds little respect for democracy, naming it
a “train” that Turkey may disembark from whenever it pleases. In
addition, Erdogan believes that freedom and democracy are ideals
that have “no value.” Erdogan’s statements also express a dislike
of freedom of speech. He attempted to ban numerous social media
outlets critical of his Presidency, declared that the media should
never have been given freedom to “insult,” and asserted his
increasing opposition to the internet. These contentious statements
and actions display Erdogan’s antipathy towards democracy and
freedom of speech in general. Both are barriers, which hinder his
quest for absolute control over the Republic.

The Future of the Republic
In light of Erdogan’s clear hostility to secular governance and
123
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democracy, combined with the unprecedented powers now vested
in him by the 2017 Constitution, Turkey’s future hinges on one
critical question: is this the end of Ataturk’s legacy? Nearly one
hundred years ago, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created the Republic of
Turkey as a secular democracy which placed the people’s
sovereignty above all else. This system of government, though not
without flaws, accorded Turkish citizens a voice in their nation’s
future. The 2017 Constitution undoes Ataturk’s legacy. It grants
the President sweeping political powers, transfers the Prime
Minister’s duties to the Presidency, and weakens the Grand
National Assembly’s power to check executive authority. President
Erdogan possesses a well-documented history as an outspoken
advocate of Islamist government, with ties to fundamentalist
Islamist groups and politicians, including the Palestinian terror
network Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and the
Brotherhood’s leader Mohamed Morsi. Furthermore, Erdogan is an
avid supporter of revising Turkey’s educational system to include
Islamic history classes, as part of a broader campaign to raise
Turkey’s newest generation to be more religious than the last.
Erdogan is also an ardent admirer of Turkey’s Ottoman past, even
going so far as to dress Turkish soldiers as Ottoman janissaries
during important political events in order to recapture the glory of
the Empire. Additionally, he socializes with a number of neoOttoman politicians bent on the rebirth of the Ottoman Empire.
With the increased executive power granted to him under the 2017
Constitution, Erdogan could eventually reintegrate Islamic law into
Turkish governance. This would result in the death of the Republic
as a secular power and the final destruction of Ataturk’s legacy.
In addition to dismantling Turkey’s secular government,
the 2017 Constitution also opens the door for the end of Turkish
democracy. Erdogan’s political history and statements demonstrate
that he desires absolute control over the Republic and will not
hesitate to eliminate individuals who stand in his way. Following
the 2016 Turkish coup, Erdogan carried out an enormous purge of
media outlets, academics, and ordinary citizens opposed to his
leadership. Many of these individuals committed no crime. They
simply voiced their disapproval aloud or possessed ephemeral ties
to Erdogan’s enemies. Most ominously, Erdogan stated that liberty
and democracy had little meaning in the Republic, and he is well
positioned to act on his rhetoric. Indeed, Erdogan’s actions and
words suggest that he aims to strip the Republic not only of its
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status as a secular nation, but as a democracy itself.
Bearing Erdogan’s actions and newfound power in mind,
Turkey’s future rests firmly in the hands of the President. Given
his record so far, it seems likely that Erdogan will use the
expanded Presidency to make himself the absolute authority in the
Republic of Turkey. Indeed, Erdogan now possesses all of the
necessary tools and powers to govern as an autocrat. He has
already abused the power to declare states of emergency in order
extend the current political purge, until he eliminates the
opposition or terrorizes them into silence. Likewise, he will utilize
the power to appoint and dismiss high office officials to rid the
government of his rivals and replace them with cooperative
puppets. In addition, so long as the AKP possesses a political
majority in the Grand National Assembly, any Presidential decree
Erdogan declares will pass, especially considering his dual role as
President and party leader. Furthermore, if Erdogan builds strong
Islamic support within the Republic, he could pave the way for the
reintegration of Islamic law into Turkish government. Should
Erdogan take this path, the Republic of Turkey will cease to exist
as Ataturk intended and be transformed from a secular democracy
into an Islamic authoritarian state.

Conclusion
Nearly one hundred years ago, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk envisioned
a new Turkey. He drew upon his experiences as a citizen of the
Ottoman Empire, analyzing the failings of its political and social
systems in order to create a nation that he believed would weather
the test of time. Ataturk believed religion led to the social,
political, and technological stagnation of the Ottoman Empire.
Thus, religion was separated from government to the greatest
degree possible in the newborn Republic. He saw the corruption
created by a system of governance deaf to the voice of the common
people as antithetical to the stability and prosperity of a modern
nation. Consequently, Ataturk and his allies set about to create a
representative system, defended by a series of institutionalized
checks and balances. In order to solidify these reforms, Ataturk led
a campaign of aggressive secularization and westernization. The
end result was a government with a ceremonial Presidency and a
strong Parliament that shared its executive authority with an
equally powerful Prime Minister.
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The passage of the revised 2017 Constitution reverses the
nation’s political balance of power, by empowering the Presidency,
eliminating the office of Prime Minister, and weakening the
Parliament’s ability to check the executive branch’s authority.
Under this redesigned system, the nation’s future is largely
dependent upon the type of individual the Turkish people choose to
elect as President. Thus, a corrupt President will not act in the
nation’s best interests. He will take advantage of the powers
granted to him by the Constitution, using his immense political
clout to dominate the Republic’s political system and drive all
opposition into exile, or worse.
President Erdogan’s character, political history, and
controversial statements seem to suggest that he will use the power
of the revised Constitution to transform the Republic of Turkey
into an Islamic authoritarian state. Erdogan is a supporter of the
religious revision of Turkish education, communes regularly with
neo-Ottoman politicians, and voiced his unwavering support for
controversial Islamist organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim
Brotherhood. He abused the powers granted to him by the recent
Turkish state of emergency to rid the Republic of his rivals.
Finally, Erdogan waged war against social media platforms for
uncovering government corruption and declared that Turkey no
longer needed liberty or democracy. The 2017 Constitution grants
Erdogan all the tools he needs to expand these policies, widen the
length and scope of his political purges, and pave the way toward
the end of secularism in Turkey. The Grand National Assembly
now lacks the ability to stop Erdogan, should the Turkish people
wish for it to intercede. Thus, Turkey is now at the mercy of
Erdogan and the AKP. Ataturk’s secular Republic is dead, all that
remains to be seen now is just what form Erdogan’s new,
autocratic order will take, and whether it will attempt to re-assert
itself as a neo-Ottoman power in the Middle East.
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